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Abstract
Although measures of sensitivity to inequality are important in judging the welfare 
effects of health-care programmes, it is far from straightforward how to elicit them 
and apply them in health-care decision-making. This paper provides an overview 
of the literature on the measurement of inequality aversion, examines some of the 
features specific of the health domain that depart from the income domain, and dis-
cusses its implementation in health-system priority-setting decisions. We find evi-
dence that individuals exhibit a preference for more equitable health distribution, 
but inequality aversion estimates from the literature are unclear. Unlike the income-
inequality literature, standard approaches in the health economics do not follow a 
‘veil-of-ignorance’ approach and elicit mostly bivariate (income-related health) ine-
quality aversion estimates. We suggest some ideas to reduce the disconnect between 
the income inequality and health economics literature.
Keywords Attitudes to inequality · Inequality aversion · Health · Income · Survey 
data · Priority setting
JEL Classification I19
Introduction
There is a widespread consensus that the attainment of health improvements is a 
desirable outcome of a health system. But there is more to health than the overall 
value of health-care treatment (Porter, 2010). For instance, new health technolo-
gies might improve the health of some individuals at the cost of increasing health 
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inequality if other individuals cannot afford such new technologies, or are not aware 
of them and hence fail to use them. Accordingly, the reduction in health inequalities 
is recognised in legislation as one of the primary goals of European health systems.1 
However, valuations of health-care programmes are seldom adjusted to allow for the 
welfare loss resulting from the health-inequality implications of different courses of 
action. So, an important question for the design and management of health systems 
is: how should one measure the extent to which a society is willing to trade off max-
imising health for reductions in health inequality? This is essentially what the eco-
nomics literature defines as inequality aversion. A second question naturally follows: 
how should this measure of inequality aversion be incorporated in the prioritisation 
of health programmes?
Decisions on which health programmes should be financed entail trade-offs 
between heterogeneous notions of health-system value (such as health gain, health 
inequality and health-care quality), and in some cases between certain individuals 
who are lagging behind in some dimension of health status. When such a trade-
off exists, decision makers, as agents of a wider society, must implicitly or explic-
itly take account of how tolerant of inequality a society is. However, standard 
approaches to decision-making in health-care follow a utilitarian path by taking an 
unweighted summation of the health effects of a programme (Williams & Cook-
son, 2000); only in exceptional circumstances is consideration given to the use of 
equity weights—one example of this is Robson, Asaria, Cookson, Tsuchiya, and Ali 
(2017).2 However, individuals’ decision-making on social issues does not necessar-
ily follow utilitarianism, in that individuals often favour options that are not the best 
outcome aggregated over all those affected (Baron, 1994).
Health is argued to be one of the basic freedoms and opportunities of individuals 
(Anand, 2002), a case can be made that only under very exceptional circumstances 
could one identify unambiguous instances of legitimate inequalities in health. By 
contrast, it is more common to identify income inequalities that are tolerated or jus-
tified on the basis of differences in effort (such as higher pay for longer hours of 
work), human capital investment (higher pay for experienced workers as opposed 
to workers undergoing training) or need (for example higher wages in more affluent 
provinces). In such circumstances, tolerance of inequality affects the welfare loss 
that a society experiences from living with health inequality, a decision maker ought 
to minimise the losses in people’s wellbeing or utility. To do this, one needs to know 
the weight that society places on the health gains directed to those with poor health 
compared to overall health standards. However, to date we still lack clear evidence 
about how averse a society is to inequality in order to produce equity weights in 
guiding health-care priority setting, and whether such aversion is domain specific.3
1 See Costa-Font and Hernández-Quevedo (2012) for a summary of the application of such methods, and 
specifically to the measurement and use of bivariate (or income related) health inequalities.
2 Such weights can result from the use of a health-related social welfare function that increases with 
both an increase in aggregate health and a reduction of health inequalities (Culyer & Wagstaff, 1993).
3 One of the limitations to elicit inequality aversion estimates lie sin that individuals tend to follow a ‘no 
harm’ principle, namely that it is wrong to harm some people in order to help others, even though such a 
rule might lead to causing harm through omission (Baron, 1995).
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The view that inequality preferences vary by domain was developed by Tobin 
(1970) who coined the idea of ‘specific egalitarianism’ to distinguish a specific aver-
sion to inequalities in ‘basic needs’, from inequalities in other (less basic) goods.4 
However, this is ultimately an empirical question, especially in settings where infor-
mation and knowledge are the most important: health-production inputs, which are, 
in turn, highly correlated with income (Kenkel, 1991).
In addition to the differences in attitudes across inequality domains, people’s 
preferences might differ depending on what dimensions of the self, public or pri-
vate are primed in the elicitation processes. That is, preferences may be contingent 
on the different roles people play in public and private realms: in the latter realm 
they are ‘citizens’. Whilst individuals valuing health programmes as self-interested 
consumers of health care might not value a reduction in inequality in health, when 
they are asked about the issue as citizens who are making a choice in the abstract, 
they might give weight to equity considerations in making choices among health-
care programmes.5 In a health-system budget experiment revealing the valuation of 
health programmes relative to others, Costa-Font, Sato, and Rovira-Forns (2017) 
find evidence that individuals value health equity as one of the main goals of the 
health system in the context of a hypothetical health-care reform. This evidence 
is consistent with the idea that priority-setting decisions in the health sector result 
from some notion of ‘fair share’ in allocating resources (Margolis, 1984).6 Accord-
ingly, individuals face a trade-off between allocating resources to the social group, 
and to themselves.
This paper attempts to provide answers to the following questions. How specific 
is inequality aversion in health, and how does it compare to other domains such 
as income? What are the methods available to elicit inequality aversion? How can 
information on inequality aversion guide the setting of priorities in the contexts 
of a publicly funded health insurance scheme? We begin with an overview of how 
to conceptualise inequality aversion in the health domain, and how it differs from 
the income domain. We discuss elicitation methodologies, and we also discuss the 
evidence from different studies, as well as how such evidence can be employed to 
inform priority setting in a welfare economic decision framework. We propose an 
inequality aversion elicitation strategy to emulate an environment of choice that 
is close to the ‘veil of ignorance’. The idea behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ is that 
individuals should make choices blind to their own circumstances and self-interest. 
Finally, the paper proposes some notions to include inequality preferences in health-
care priority setting.
4 However, such distinction is likely to vary on context specific value judgements. Basic needs in some 
countries might refer to food and first necessity goods, whilst in other settings, it might extend beyond 
those goods.
5 This might produce an allocation that would be closer to evaluations that would emerge from following 
a Harsanyi (1955) social welfare function.
6 According to Margolis (1984), for each person allocating individual and social resources, it is possible 
to identify a weight attached to resources allocated to the social group, and resources allocated to the 
individual.
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Inequality Aversion in Health
Inequality Aversion: An Overview
It is now well established that inequality aversion is an important parameter of an 
individual’s welfare. Individuals usually prefer allocations between policy options 
that are perceived as ‘fairer’ than the alternatives, and experimental evidence shows 
participants are willing to face a sacrifice to act cooperatively (Fehr & Gächter, 
2000). Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, and O’Doherty (2010) find neural evidence 
(changes in two areas of the brain, the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex) suggesting that high-pay individuals exhibit higher gain from paying to oth-
ers as compared to themselves. In the context of attitudes towards the distribution of 
organ transplants, Ubel and Loewenstein (1996) find that individuals prefer an egali-
tarian equilibrium of giving everyone the chance of having a transplant even though 
the possibility of failure might be higher for certain groups, hence reducing overall 
health. This pattern of preference is clearly consistent with an approach that places 
positive weight on considerations of inequality aversion.
Amiel and Cowell (1992; 1999) provided evidence of inequality aversion using 
questionnaire experiments and Cowell and Schokkaert (2001) explain how inequality 
aversion is reflective of risk preferences. However, there is still no consensus on the 
shape of such inequality preferences and its behavioural underpinnings, let alone the 
variability of inequality aversion parameters. Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom (2017) 
argued that humans naturally favour fair distributions, not equal ones, and that when 
fairness and equality clash, people prefer ‘fair inequality’ over ‘unfair equality’.
There is little consensus on the estimation of inequality aversion in the context 
of income; much the same applies in studies of attitudes to health inequalities. The 
approaches in the literature include the definition of the health-related welfare function 
and the incorporation of equity values in it (Wagstaff, Paci, & Van Doorslaer, 1991), as 
well as the use of utility weights in the decision-making process (Robson et al., 2017).7
By contrast, in the sociology literature it is usually assumed that social norms 
determine what society regards as an ‘acceptable inequality’, and that such norms are 
shaped by common history and past institutions (Lübker, 2006). Some concerns on the 
elicitation of attitudes to inequality refer to the capacity of respondents to think care-
fully about a wellbeing sacrifice to attain an equity improvement. Inequality aversion 
can result from the process of social learning, by observing others’ pay-offs (which 
may diminish the value of their own pay-offs). Hence, there have been limited efforts 
in the measurement of inequality preferences, especially in the health domain.
Health status may be only to a limited extent the result of individual choice: there 
is an important role for luck (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2011; Segall, 2010). If the luck 
component influencing health—for example, genetics—is perceived to be more impor-
tant than in other areas of behaviour then that would lead to justifying different inequal-
ity preferences. Anand (2002) argues that we should be more concerned with inequali-
ties in health than with inequalities in other dimensions as there is less that individuals 
7 In the latter approach attitudes towards outcomes are separated from attitudes towards inequality but it 
does not capture the direct trade-off between outcomes and inequality in outcomes.
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can do to produce health. However, the extent to which this is true may be context 
specific: for example, it may be true for highly income-mobile societies, but not else-
where. In this respect, Segall (2010) argues that health care is not a special domain in 
its application of luck egalitarianism.
The way an individual conceptualises the causality between health and choice can 
be explained by evolutionary expectations (Brosnan, 2006), or in terms of differential 
loss aversion. For example, Dolan and Robinson (2001) argue that loss aversion can 
explain differential inequality aversion in two experiments exhibiting different inequal-
ity aversion estimates. This is explained by the fact that reference points that people 
use can differ among individuals and vary across time; so, the final social equilibrium 
that determines inequality aversion might be affected by changes modifying such refer-
ence points. Envy can be a powerful factor underlying perception of loss. Alternatively, 
an individual’s inequality aversion might reflect some larger ‘group interest’, which 
includes altruism but may extend beyond that to include identity-driven behaviour 
(Costa-Font & Cowell, 2015).
What is Special About Health‑Inequality Comparisons?
It is important to focus on the specific details of how people think about fairness in the 
health domain—for example, whether they think of health as the outcomes of choices, 
or whether the causality between choice and ill health is difficult to establish. Tradi-
tional concepts of inequality aversion focus on the distributions of equalisands such as 
income which that are both transferable and scarce (Bojer, 2005). In this respect, health 
is different from income as it is the outcome of a household production process and 
is produced subject to a higher level of uncertainty. Although some health inputs are 
known ex ante—such as health care—one can argue that health depends on a wider set 
of inputs such as nutrition and exercise, some of which are indeed transferable.
Most studies in the health domain estimate bivariate measures of inequality aversion 
which tend to use income (rather than health) as status variable to measure inequal-
ity and can be described as income-related health-inequality aversion (IRHIA). That 
is, these studies estimate the welfare reduction in health improvements among lower-
income (more deprived) groups. However, such measures are an extension of individ-
ual income-based inequality aversion measures to a different outcome variable (health 
rather than income) as opposed to health-inequality aversion. This is itself a significant 
departure from the elicitation methods of the income-inequality literature where ine-
quality aversion refers to a single-variable equalisand, as we describe in the following 
section.
A Simple Theoretical Framework
Inequality aversion in the health domain requires an elicitation of individuals’ trade-offs 
between changes in health and health inequality. This requires a theoretical framework 
that allows for a direct comparison of inequality aversion in different domains. An exam-
ple of an inequality aversion framework applicable to different domains is the following 
model, developed by Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson‐Stenman (2005). It is assumed 
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that individuals care about their health or income (y) and health or income inequality ( 훷 ) 
according to preferences given by the following type of utility function
where 훾 is a parameter. For example, if we adopt the coefficient of variation as the 
inequality index 훷 , then (1) can be written as
where ȳ denotes average health status and 휎
y
 is the standard deviation of health sta-
tus. Then take two different societies A and B that differ in how health is distributed, 
and identify the value of 훾 that renders individuals indifferent between two societies 
that differ in their health status y and health inequality 훷 as follows:
It is clear that the value of 훾 will affect the welfare loss of alternative programmes that 
affect health and health inequality (or total income and income inequality). The rest of 
this paper will examine how to estimate and interpret such inequality aversion values.
The Measurement of ‘True’ Inequality Preferences
One of the main problems in measuring social decisions is that individuals are unlikely 
to reveal their ‘true preferences’, and will conceal their own self-interest. The Rawls 
(1971) concept of a ‘veil of ignorance’, behind which individuals seek to agree on appro-
priate social choice rules without knowing what position they will hold in society, is a 
convenient device for the purposes of discussion. However, the practical implementation 
of such a concept is limited given that individuals obviously do know their position in 
society. Whilst some studies try to emulate or approximate a veil of ignorance by posing 
hypothetical questions (or by asking individuals to consider decisions made on behalf of 
their descendants), other studies tend to disregard such veil-of-ignorance approaches and 
focus on eliciting people’s values through choice or budget experiments.
Choice‑Based and Budget Experiment Methods
A number of studies provide inequality-preference estimates by using methods involv-
ing choices between health programmes to test different elicitation procedures; some 
of these employ non-representative population sample data (Ali, Tsuchiya, Asaria, & 
Cookson, 2017) whilst some work with samples that are representative of the gen-
eral population (Abásolo & Tsuchiya, 2008). Other studies employ online surveys to 
retrieve experimental evidence—for example Robson et  al. (2017) use this method 
to elicit a measure of IRHIA for England. These studies produce inequality aversion 
estimates for policy purposes, but depart significantly from the standard methodology 
in the income-inequality literature, mainly because they define inequality as different 
(1)u = h(y훷
−훾 )
(2)u = h
(
y
(
ȳ
𝜎y
)𝛾)
(3)훾 =
ln(yA∕yB)
ln(훷A∕훷B)
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health outcomes across groups defined by income levels as a measure of status. Fur-
thermore, the participants’ choices are made in the absence of a budget constraint to 
spell out the trade-offs implicit in the selection of alternatives with differing levels of 
inequality. Perhaps as a result of this, the inequality aversion estimates differ signifi-
cantly in magnitude from those found in the income-inequality literature.
Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2013) elicit inequality aversion estimates from experi-
ments involving subjects’ choices of states of the world characterised by different 
amounts of inequality. Nonetheless, as with most studies in the health-economics 
literature, experimental evidence is typically not designed to conform to the theo-
retical requirement of veil-of-ignorance preferences. Furthermore, as is common in 
such empirical exercises, subjects are not presented with an implicit budget con-
straint in terms of the costs of alternative programmes that improve health equity.
Alternatively, other studies focus on choices of respondents acting as decision makers 
allocating a budget, which is what we can broadly define as ‘budget experiments. Indeed, 
although some of the standard elicitation methods described above have an ‘implicit budget 
constraint’, they usually do not explicitly specify a budget constraint where the cost of a pro-
gramme, either to the individual or the health system, is considered. An alternative option 
to elicit preferences over health-system equity lies in asking participants to allocate a budget 
resulting from a potentially realistic health-care reform to a number of health programmes 
attaining a number of health benefits. Costa-Font, Forns, and Sato (2015) report evidence 
from such a budget experiment to show that, although health-care programmes that improve 
health-care equity are highly prioritised, the willingness to allocate resources to such pro-
grammes (and hence to reduce the allocation to other programmes) is limited, suggesting 
that there is a limit to how much a society, even at a collective level, is willing to improve 
health-system equity. This is typically the case because prioritising programmes that 
improve health equity comes at a cost of expanding programmes that attain other health-
system benefits. However, such kinds of study do not employ representative samples and, 
although they measure inequality aversion at a health-system level, they are not based on a 
veil-of-ignorance approach, such as those described in “Veil-of-Ignorance Approaches” sec-
tion. So, it is likely that they are not reflective of individuals’ ‘true preferences’.
Veil‑of‑Ignorance Approaches
In contrast to elicitation techniques that directly elicit people’s values, there are poten-
tial methods where people are not making choices purely based on their own immedi-
ate benefit. This is especially important in the health domain where the role of choice 
in explaining outcomes might be more restricted than in other domains. One recent 
approach consistent with the ‘veil-of-ignorance’ approach is Costa-Font and Cowell 
(2019) which employs the so-called grandchild approach to estimating individuals’ aver-
sion to both income and health inequality simultaneously. The paper uses the results 
from an internet questionnaire on income-inequality and health-inequality perceptions 
employing numerically based questions—see the accompanying text box for an exam-
ple. By varying the magnitudes in the questions, it is possible to estimate the inequality 
aversion implied by the responses in both income and health domains.
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Q1. Again we'd like to know what kind of world you would consider it beer for your
grandchild to live in. We ask you to make a choice between two scenarios A and B which 
diﬀer in terms of the range of life expectancy in society (life expectancy is measured at 
birth; in every other respect A and B are the same) and let us know which, if any, you 
think would be beer.
Scenario A Life expectancy is between 40 and 80, with an average of 60.
Scenario B Life expectancy is between 60 and 70, with an average of 65.
Keeping in mind your grandchild could be located anywhere in the range: Which scenario would you 
choose? 
1. A
2. B
3. A and B equally good
4. Can't say
Other Approaches
The other approaches that have been employed by the general literature on inequal-
ity aversion are mostly specific to the case where income is used as the variable of 
interest. These include so-called leaky-bucket experiments, hypothetical trade union 
negotiations, dictator games and ultimatum games. However, all of them are hypo-
thetical and involve pay-offs that are of limited use in health decision-making; this 
is principally because health, unlike income, cannot be transferred interpersonally.
What Do We Know About Health‑Inequality Aversion so Far?
One of the most important finding from the literature is that the population exhibits 
widespread income-related health-inequality aversion, and that estimates of IRHIA 
are large, in most cases ten times larger than estimates for income-inequality aver-
sion. However, such estimates derive from the use of heterogenous methods and 
techniques that vary considerably across studies. With very few exceptions, empiri-
cal studies in the health-economics literature are generally disconnected from the 
equivalent methods that are commonly used in the income-inequality literature. 
Although the methodological disconnect partly refers to the fact that income can be 
transferred, the use of veil-of-ignorance assumptions in eliciting inequality prefer-
ences is common to both literatures.
As mentioned, coefficients refer to income-related inequality aversion rather than 
to unconditional health inequalities. This means that attitudes towards other sources 
of health inequality are disregarded, and instead they reflect an extension of income-
related inequalities to a different outcome variable. Whilst this approach is based on 
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considerations that are relevant to policy in some western countries, it gives some 
indication of the scope of health inequalities.
Table  1 provides a list (by date of publication) of some of the principal stud-
ies that have attempted to estimate the trade-offs between health and a measure of 
health inequality, either within the population as a whole or within some naturally 
defined group, such as a city, or a role-defined group, such as politicians. The most 
salient feature is how heterogeneous the studies are. Some studies aim at finding 
equity weights to pursue a cost-effectiveness analysis in a way that accounts for 
population inequality aversion, whilst other studies either simply aim at testing for 
the presence of some attitudes that resemble inequality aversion, or test some of the 
underlying theories underpinning the potential social welfare function that explains 
people’s preferences.
Early studies examine preferences of politicians as representatives of the popu-
lation. Lindholm, Rosén, and Emmelin (1998) found that given a choice between 
two programmes (one which is more effective but does not eliminate inequality and 
the other which is less effective but eliminates inequality), Swedish politicians are 
prepared to sacrifice 15 out of 100 preventable deaths to achieve equity in death 
rates between blue and white-collar workers. Similarly, Emmelin, Lindholm, Sten-
lund, and Dahlgren (1999) estimate that 12.2% of respondents want to direct the 
programme towards the socially disadvantaged as opposed to improving the health 
of the general population. These results can be taken as evidence that actual deci-
sion makers care about health inequality. However, from this type of study one can-
not conclude that the views of the population’s representatives really represent the 
view of the population. This is the case because individuals’ voting choices can be 
driven by a large number of disparate factors, and often health may not weigh heav-
ily among those factors. Several other studies examine evidence from different sam-
ples of the general public. With a few exceptions these surveys are not representative 
of the population.
One of the important exceptions is Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2008) who survey 
a representative sample of the Spanish population to document evidence that the 
general public in Spain does have some concern about health equity. Furthermore, 
they identify some of the correlated factors about what makes some people more 
egalitarian than other, many of which—such as income or education—were not sig-
nificant. Survey experiments have been used to examine the theoretical properties 
of people’s choices on health equity (Abásolo & Tsuchiya, 2013). Other important 
studies such as Tsuchiya and Dolan (2007) examine differences between member of 
the public and individuals working for the National Health Service, and they show 
that individuals are more averse to inequality than clinicians.
Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2014) examine survey evidence from Spain concerning 
decision makers who have to choose between two alternative health programmes. 
They specifically identify whether individuals that happen to be more altruistic are 
indeed more supportive of health-care programmes that are more equitable. Impor-
tantly, they confirm evidence of an association using blood donation as a proxy for 
altruism. On the underlying explanation for inequality aversion, Edlin, Tsuchiya, 
and Dolan (2012) find that, whilst responsibility matters, it does not seem to be 
pivotal in explaining people’s choices that remained anchored in some level of 
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 3 Table 1  Studies measuring health-inequality aversion (trade-offs between health and a measure of inequality) in health
Note The table summarises the main studies that elicit a measure of inequality aversion employing methods that have some level of external validity to a specific geo-
graphical community
Study Method Findings
Lindholm et al. (1998) Survey of Swedish politicians asked to choose between two 
programmes (one which is more effective but does not eliminate 
inequality and the other which is less effective but eliminates 
inequality)
Swedish politicians are prepared to sacrifice 15 of 100 preventable 
deaths to achieve equity
Emmelin et al. (1999) The survey entailed Swedish politicians answering hypothetical 
questions on preferences for specific intervention to communities 
with excess mortality
Strong support for equity-driven interventions explained by political 
support
Tsuchiya and Dolan (2007) Questionnaire eliciting peoples’ preferences over maximising life 
expectancy and reducing inequalities in life expectancy between 
the highest and lowest social classes was completed by 271 mem-
bers of the UK public and 220 NHS clinicians
Respondents of the general public are more willingness than clini-
cians to sacrifice total health for fairer distribution
Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2008) Representative sample of Spanish population choosing between two 
programmes, one of which targets low-income individuals
Middle age, people living in low-income province and supporters of 
the left are more egalitarian. Neither sex, nor income and education 
exerted a significant a preference for egalitarian targets
Edlin et al. (2012) Over 500 members of the general public in the UK are interviewed 
in their homes about a number of trade-off between different 
states of health of different groups
Reveal priority of treating those with poorer health but individual 
responsibility does splay a role, values of inequality aversion vary 
between 4 and 6
Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2013) Survey representative of the Spanish population examining prefer-
ences over socio-economic inequalities in life expectancy
Evidence indicates violation of monotonicity
Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2014) Egalitarianism is measured by responses to a Survey question in 
Spain based on a hypothetical choice between two health pro-
grammes targeting the lower class and donating blood is taken as 
a proxy of altruism
The probability of an altruist individual supporting egalitarianism is 
10% higher than for a non-altruist person. No evidence of an asso-
ciation between age, socio-economic status or religious practices
Robson et al. (2017) Online survey data from 244 respondents of the general population 
in England that incorporate video animation
81% of the population reports some level of inequality aversion and 
an inequality aversion magnitude of 11
Ali et al. (2017) Survey experiment employing participants in a citizens panel in the 
city of York and an online sample of 83 people
Large inequality aversion 3–4, with smaller estimates for concrete 
and online elicitation techniques
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health-inequality aversion. Although employing a small-scale experiment, Dolan 
and Robinson (2001) invoke loss aversion as an explanation for differences in lev-
els of inequality aversion across different experiments. This evidence suggests that 
there is a need to investigate further the behavioural foundations of health-inequality 
preferences.
Robson et al. (2017) employ pairwise choices between two programmes, which 
would increase expected years in full health and classify respondents as ‘Pro-Rich’, 
‘Health Maximisers’, ‘weighted Prioritarians’ (give greater weight to the health of 
the worse-off), ‘maximin’ (improving the health of the worst-off) and ‘egalitarians’ 
(sacrifice potential health to benefit the worst-off). They find evidence that 81% of 
the population interviewed does exhibit inequality concerns of some kind, and they 
provide evidence of large implicit inequality aversion estimates. The data come from 
a small online survey that is not representative of the UK population.
Finally, Ali et al. (2017) use non-representative samples to provide estimates of 
the effect of elicitation techniques and modes of administration. They find evidence 
that inequality-reduction scenarios (whether large or small) did not make a differ-
ence but they find that concrete scenarios as opposed to abstract ones reduce ine-
quality aversion, and that face-to-face surveys elicit higher inequality aversion; the 
latter finding is consistent with observability effects typical of decisions affected by 
warm glow.
Inequality Preferences to Assist Priority Setting
Given that individuals seem to be inequality averse, how should we best incorpo-
rate inequality aversion in setting priorities among health-care programmes? The 
WHO regards equity as one of the criteria to evaluate health-system performance. 
However, empirical evidence indicates that individuals when making health-system 
decisions subject to limited health-care budgets are not always prepared to sacrifice 
other potential health-care programmes that improve other dimensions of health-
system value to reduce inequalities in health (Costa-Font et al., 2015).
The theoretical framework underpinning priority setting in health care assumes 
the presence of some kind of ‘health-related social welfare function’ which is max-
imised, subject to institutional and resource constraints. Equity considerations can 
be introduced through a variety of welfare approaches. They can enter the utility 
function as a ‘value parameter’, or as a weight on the health and welfare that differ-
ent health-care programmes bring. Another way to introduce equity is by implicitly 
or explicitly weighting certain diseases or patient groups which, if treated, would 
improve the equity of the system (Olsen, 1997).
Nonetheless, some studies in health economics argue for extra-welfarist 
approaches which subscribe to the idea that health is a capability that is beyond indi-
viduals’ choice (Coast, 2009). Accordingly, health can be maximised on its own, 
irrespective of individual utility considerations. However, such approaches ignore 
both equity and process utility gains, where the latter refers to gains from pro-
grammes that improve the process of health-care delivery but not health outcomes. 
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to different individuals with different endowments might not affect social welfare to 
the same degree. Finally, as we have discussed above, there might well be potential 
health-equity gains from a health system.
The standard decision framework at the health-system context is that of choice 
of a subset of health programmes for possible implementation when there is insuf-
ficient budget to fund all of the available potential programmes. In such a context, 
some kind of priority setting based on the welfare effects (such as cost-effectiveness) 
can consider the equity effects of different allocations. Under these circumstances, 
one would need to adjust or weight the overall welfare of each combination of pro-
grammes by the preferences over how such a combination of programmes affect the 
distribution of health and other health-system outcomes.
Conclusion
The consideration of inequality preferences is an important piece of information 
in guiding health-care decision-making. We have argued that inequality aversion 
measures can be used to construct weights on the individual outcomes of differ-
ent health-care programmes in order to assist the priority-setting process of pub-
licly funded health systems. Higher aversion to inequality entails a higher weight 
on those health-care programmes that improve the health of individuals that exhibit 
poorer health. However, most of the existing techniques to assist health-care prior-
ity setting cannot properly consider the welfare effects of different distributions of 
health outcomes. So far, the literature in health economics has focused on prefer-
ence-elicitation studies which typically elicit the trade-offs between different pro-
grammes affecting individuals of different socio-economic status. However, these 
studies show limited consensus on the value of inequality aversion estimates and, 
for the most part, exhibit limited external validity. That is, with few exceptions, most 
studies are experimental and they depart from the welfare-economics literature in 
that they do not propose a choice scenario that conforms to some ‘veil-of-ignorance’ 
measure. There are important limitations in the use of inequality preferences such as 
the limited standardisation in the elicitation procedures and the different conception 
of health equity mostly based on bivariate measures of (socio-economic or income-
related) inequality; all of this is important for policy purposes.
Adopting domain-specific inequality aversion seems to be a sensible approach to 
follow, although we still know little about how inequality aversion varies by domain. 
If individuals exhibit different degrees of inequality aversion in the health domain 
and in the income domain, then one would expect the valuation of programmes that 
have no bearing on the distribution of income not to be adjusted by the income-
specific inequality aversion. Similarly, if a health programme does not influence 
the health of the population directly but rather through an indirect income channel 
(for example, through the amounts of copayment), then income-inequality aversion 
should be employed to compute its welfare effects.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that there is substantial scope for bringing 
together the insights from the income-inequality literature and the health-econom-
ics literature, to produce analytical tools and measures that are theoretically sound, 
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irrespective of the domain of inequality being examined. Overall, it is central to note 
two potential developments that could assist in achieving such a goal. First, stud-
ies measuring health-inequality aversion should attempt to include veil-of-ignorance 
approaches. Second, studies should ideally focus on distinguishing income- and 
health-inequality aversion estimates as opposed to eliciting a combined (bivariate) 
measure that does not take account of the domain of inequality.
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